Stranded assets risk derails Vietnam's plan for new coal power plants by Ha-Duong, Minh
HAL Id: halshs-02263622
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02263622
Submitted on 5 Aug 2019
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Stranded assets risk derails Vietnam’s plan for new coal
power plants
Minh Ha-Duong
To cite this version:
Minh Ha-Duong. Stranded assets risk derails Vietnam’s plan for new coal power plants. 2019. ￿halshs-
02263622￿
S t r a nd e d  a s s e t s  ri s k  d er ail s  Vi e tn a m ’s  pl a n  for n e w  
c o al  p o w er  pl a nt s
Minh Ha-Duong1
2019-07-30
Ab s tr a c t :  In 2016, Vietnam planned to build a fleet of new coal-fired power plants, expanding capacity to 54.5 GW in 
2030, from 13.1 GW in 2015. Three years later, the risk of stranded assets not only made this plan sub-optimal, it also 
made it infeasible because investors are looking elsewhere.
Introdu c tion: Vi e tn a m ’s  pl a n  for a  
fl e e t  o f  c o a l  p o w er  pl a n t s
Vietnam  has  a  socialist-oriented  market  economy,  where 
the  state  sector  plays  the  decisive  role  in  directing 
economic development. State owned enterprises form the 
backbone  of  the  energy  sector.  Development  of  the 
electricity sector is guided by ten-years Power Development 
Master  Plans,  usually  adjusted  with  a  mid-term  revision. 
The plans determine  power  sources development,  power 
grids development, connectivity with neighboring countries 
and electrification of remote areas.  In addition to ensuring 
the  engineering  coherence  of  sources  and  grid 
developments,  plans  have  administrative  power:  projects 
need to be included in the plan to be authorized.
The current Power Development Plan is P D P 7  r e vi s e d , the 
mid-term revision of the seventh plan, for 2011-2020 with a 
vision  to  2030  (Nguyễn  Tấn  Dũng  2016).  The  core 
electricity supply strategy of PDP7 was to build a fleet of 
coal  power  plants.  Vietnam  achieved  13.1 GW  of  coal-
based  generation  capacity  in  2015.  In  January  2016, 
Vietnam’s  former  Prime  Minister,  Nguyen  Tan  Dung, 
announced he would “review development plans of all new 
coal  plants  and  halt  any  new coal  power  development”. 
That was only partially realized in the 2016 PDP7 revision. 
The  strategy  was  reduced  by  23 GW, targeting  ‘only’ 
54.5 GW of coal in 2030 – out of 72 GW total additions. As 
Figure 1 shows, that meant building 33.7 GW of new coal 
power generation between 2016 and 2024.
How  it i s  n ot  h app e nin g
Three years later,  reality has diverged from the plan to a 
point  where Vietnam  is  facing  the  prospect  of  power 
shortages from 2019 onward. The causes are discussed in 
(Hoàng Quốc Vượng 2019) evaluation report. This is  not 
because  the nuclear power plans  have been scrapped by 
the National Assembly in  late 2016:  those capacities were 
not  scheduled  to  come  online  before  2028. This  is  not 
because  renewable  energy  development  has  been  slow: 
Vietnam's solar  PV feed in  tariff  has been a spectacular 
success,  in  April  2019  the  connected  PV  capacity  was 
150 MW, by the end of June deadline, over 4 460 MW was 
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Figure 1: New coal power capacity in Vietnam since 
2016.
connected in 82 plants.  According to  (REN21 2019 table 
R17), only China, India, the US and Japan installed more 
PV capacity in 2018.
The return to a supply-constrained situation is attributable to 
delays in the installation of large thermal power generation 
facilities.  Natural  gas  power  plants  have  been  mostly 
constrained  by  fuel  supply  infrastructure delays,  and  will 
impact the security of supply mostly in the Southern part of 
Vietnam. And as Figure 1 shows, the delays in building new 
coal  power  plants  means that  coal  capacity  development 
fleet is behind schedule for 4.3 GW in 2019, up to around 
14 GW in 2022. Beyond these years, the situation is more 
uncertain. If one expects, as in the evaluation report, that 
coal  power  plants today at  the “permitted” or “pre-permit” 
stage will be constructed, the 2024 gap could be 9.4 GW. 
But if one assumes that no new coal power plant will start 
construction, that figure increases to 19.8 GW.
Who is responsible  for  these delays?  The plan  relied  on 
three categories of actors to build the fleet of coal power 
plant: a/ Vietnam Electricity; b/ The other two  state owned 
enterprises in the energy sector; and c/ Foreign investors.
i)  Vietnam Electricity performed as planned or better. They 
commissioned 3 044 MW on or ahead of schedule in 2016-
2018, with an additional 1 260 MW on track for 2019.
ii) The Vietnam Oil and Gas Group (PVN) owned four power 
supply  projects  with  a  total  capacity  of  5 400 MW  in  the 
Plan. All three projects under construction are delayed by 2-
3 years or more, and PVN proposed to transfer the fourth to 
another project owner. The Vietnam National Coal - Mineral 
Industries Holding Corporation Limited (TKV)  was planned 
to undertake 4 projects with a total capacity of 2 950 MW, 
including 2 in the period of 2016-2020 and 2 in the period of 
2021-2030.  All  4  projects  are now delayed by at  least  2 
years.  Of  the  three  projects  undertaking  investment 
preparation  procedures,  one  has  not  found  a  project 
location  and one is  in  the  middle  of  changing  its  project 
owner. The fourth project is not yet undertaking investment 
preparation procedures.
iii) Given the finite capital capacities of the public sector, the 
plan also relied on a program of  13  Built-Operate-Transfer 
projects with foreign investors. Most projects (eleven) were 
supposed  to  come  online  before  2024.  One  project  is 
operating:  the Vinh Tan I power station,  jointly owned by 
China Southern Power Grid and Vinacomin (TKV), was built 
successfully  seven  months  ahead  of  schedule  in  2018-
2019.  But  others  are delayed due to ‘certain obstacles in 
negotiation’  according to the evaluation report.  Three are 
under construction, expected to open in 2021-2022 with one 
year delay (Duyen Hai II  with Janakuasa and Hai Duong 
with JAKS, both from Malaysia, and Nghi Son II with Korean 
Electric Power Corp.) Four projects at the “Permitted” stage 
are expected to open in 2023-2025 behind the plan (Van 
Phong I one year, Vung Anh II two years, Nam Dinh I three 
years,  Song  Hau  three  years).  Two  at  the  “Pre-permit” 
stage are delayed by 2-3 years to after 2024, and the last 
three are unidentified and not expected before 2025.
In summary, all players but the national electricity company 
are lagging behind schedule. This situation is not unique to 
Vietnam.  (IEA 2019) noted that “In 2018, coal-fired power 
Final Investment Decisions declined by 30% to 22 GW, their 
lowest level this century [...] The largest fall in FIDs was in 
China, but levels in Southeast Asia were their lowest level 
in 14 years.”
W hy : s tr a n d e d  a s s e t s  ri s k  
d e m o tiv a t e d  inv e s t or s
Investors’ decisions are influenced by multiple causes. But 
profit  being  the main driver of companies,  we may  argue 
that  the  problem  delaying  investment in  coal  power 
generation  is an excessive  risk/rewards ratio.  In which the 
risk of severe and fast depreciation – stranded assets – is a 
major component.  There are  three main  reasons why an 
investor  would  be  cautious  about  owning  a  coal  power 
plant.
i) While up to 2015, Vietnam was producing more coal than 
it  used,  the  mining  industry  has  not  met  the  growth  in 
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demand. New coal plants run on imported fuel. The price of 
coal on the international market, while less volatile than oil 
or  gas prices,  is  still  very  uncertain:  since 2010 it  varied 
from a 50 lowest to 130 USD/Mt highest.
ii) The natural conditions for renewable energy sources are 
favorable in Vietnam,  there is lots of solar irradiation and 
lots of wind offshore. Their cost is declining with innovation 
and economies of scale.  After kickstarting the utility solar 
industry  with  a  feed  in  tariff  of  9.35  cents  per  kWh,  the 
government is moving towards auctions to reduce the costs. 
According to  (Jakob Lundsager, Nguyen Ngoc Hung, and 
Mikael  Togeby  2019),  by  2030  the  levelized  costs  of 
electricity  generation  from wind  and  solar  energy  will  be 
significantly lower than those from coal and gas in Vietnam.
iii)  The environmental standards can only get stricter. The 
capital  Hanoi  is  into  the top three most  polluted cities  in 
Southeast  Asia  (Phan 2019).  In  2015,  coal  power  plants 
caused less PM2.5 air pollution in Hanoi than agriculture, 
transport or industry, but by 2030 the power sector  would 
easily  become  the  leading  source  of  PM2.5  pollution  in 
Hanoi (Amann et al. 2019), if the planned coal plants were 
opened. The  energy  sector  is  responsible  for  most  of 
Vietnam’s GHG emissions increase by 320% between 2010 
and 2030  in its INDC’s business as usual scenario.  While 
Vietnam’s climate change policy has been slow to touch the 
energy  sector,  cautious  investors  would  assume  that 
something  such  as  an  increasing  Renewable  Portfolio 
Standards ma, only foury happen within the next few years.
A global  analysis of  6 685 coal  plants  (Gray et  al.  2018) 
finds  that  it  is  now  cheaper  to  build  new  renewable 
generation than to run 35 percent of coal plants worldwide. 
For  those  companies,  holding  on  to  coal  power  plants 
assets is not economically interesting, even if they are fully 
amortized.  The  same  report  concludes  that  by  2030, 
renewables beat out most of today’s existing and planned 
coal-fired generation in Vietnam, the average plant age at 
retirement will be 13 years, and this creates a 11.7 billion 
stranded assets risk.
In a more focused and updated analysis, (Gray et al. 2019) 
estimated that the long run marginal cost of electricity from 
Vietnam’s  coal  power  plants  was  47 USD/MWh in  2019, 
due to reliance on seaborne coal market. They expect new 
solar PV to be cheaper than new coal  by 2020 and new 
onshore wind by 2021. The year when new renewables will 
be  cheaper  than  operating  existing  coal  depends  on 
assumptions about fuel prices and technical progress, but is 
between 2028 and 2033 in the central cases.
Vietnam Electricity, as the State owned company with the 
mission to provide electricity to the Nation, is perhaps less 
affected by this business logic than other actors. But they 
cannot  escape  the  economic  constraints.  Because  of 
liquidity constraints, it is necessary to borrow or to equitize 
to finance the development of the power generation system. 
Borrowing is limited by the national debt / GDP ceiling, and 
most  large  financial  institutions  are  restraining  loans  for 
fossil  fuel  plants  anyway.  Equitizing  means  convincing 
investors  to  buy  shares  in  the  electricity  generation 
companies,  those assets  contain lots  of  aging hydro and 
thermal  power plants.  In  February 2018,  the initial  public 
offering of EVN’s subsidiary Power Generation Company 3 
was  a  big  failure,  selling  7.45  million  shares  out  of  267 
millions offered. This  demonstrates that investors had very 
low appetite for these traditional assets.
C o n clu si on s  a n d  r e c o m m e n d a tion s
What are the implications for the Power Development Plan 
8,  for  2020-2030,  currently  under  preparation  to  be 
published next year?
Vietnam’s  Prime Minister  Nguyen Xuan Phuc  recognized 
the  need  for  “minimizing  coal-fired  thermal  power, 
especially old-fashioned technology”, and particularly in the 
Mekong Delta, as it would “affect the long-term benefits of 
the  locality”  (Hau  Giang,  September  28th,  2017).  We 
advocate  for  a  clearer  and  harder “No  new  coal  power 
plants” line.  The old strategy has failed to provide energy 
supply security  and has to  be replaced. Trying harder the 
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same  thing  is  not  likely  to  work  better.  Because  of  the 
stranded assets problem, private and public investors have 
less  and  less  interest  in  building  coal  power  plants  in 
Vietnam.
Since  investors  recognize  that  the  economic  window  to 
build  new coal  generation  projects  in  Vietnam is  closed, 
only  already  permi,  only  fourtted  coal  power  generation 
units with a scheduled completion in or before 2025 should 
be kept in the next plan. The government can terminate all 
other projects on the basis of Circular 43  (Trần Tuấn Anh 
2016),  since they are late,  and relieve investors who are 
struggling to obtain financing and the administrative and the 
social licenses to operate.
We hope that the 13th National Congress in January 2021 
will adapt the Asian concept of ecological civilization as a 
key goal for Vietnamese society; leading to stricter pollution 
control  norms;  higher  fossil  fuel  taxes and import  duties; 
and  leading  the  National  Assembly  to  vote  a  2021 
Renewable  Energy  Law  enacting  a  Renewable  Portfolio 
Standards for all. But even without political leadership into 
the energy transition, many coal power plants are already 
loosing money, and that will be generalized after 2030. The 
coal plants build under BOT contract will have no residual 
value.  Vietnam  Electricity  should  already  be  ready  to 
decommission  them  after  20-25  years.  We  believe  that 
market forces are driving towards an exit from coal before 
2050.
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